A general approach to securely querying XML by E. Damiani et al.
A General Approach to Securely Querying XML
Ernesto Damiani1, Majirus Fansi2, Alban Gabillon2, and Stefania Marrara1
1 Universita` degli Studi di Milano
Dipartimento di Tecnologie dell’Informazione
via Bramante 65 26013 Crema (CR), Italy
{damiani, marrara}@dti.unimi.it
2 Universite´ de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour
IUT des Pays de l’Adour
40 000 Mont-de-Marsan, France
{janvier-majirus.fansi@etud.univ-pau.fr,
alban.gabillon@univ-pau.fr}
Abstract. Access control models for XML data can be classified in two major
categories: node filtering and query rewriting systems. The first category includes
approaches that use access policies to compute secure user views on XML data
sets. User queries are then evaluated on those views. In the second category of
approaches, authorization rules are used to transform user queries to be evaluated
against the original XML dataset. The aim of this paper is to describe a model
combining the advantages of these approaches and overcoming their limitations.
The model specification is given using a Finite State Automata, ensuring gener-
ality and easiness of standardization w.r.t. specific implementation techniques.
1 Introduction and Related Work
In the last few years, the eXtensible Markup Language (XML)[5] has become the for-
mat of choice for data interchange. XML-based systems are now widely deployed in
a number of application fields. This success has triggered a growing interest in XML
security, and several schemes for XML access control have been proposed. They can be
classified in two major categories: node filtering and query rewriting techniques. The
first category includes a number of approaches (e.g., [1], [2], [13], [17]; for a complete
survey, see [13]) that use access policies to compute secure views on XML data sets.
User queries are then evaluated on those views. Although views can be prepared off-
line, in general, view-based enforcement schemes suffer from high maintenance and
storage costs, especially for a large XML repository.
XML access control via query rewriting ([16], [15], [14], [11], [10], [7]) has been
proposed as a way to remedy these shortcomings. According to this approach, access
control rules are not directly applied to the XML dataset to be protected; rather, they are
used to translate potentially unsafe user queries into safe ones, to be evaluated against
the original XML dataset. Most current proposals translate the policy’s access con-
trol rules (ACR) to nondeterministic finite automata (NFSA) to rewrite user queries.
However, for policies that include many ACRs, NFSA backtrackings may cause un-
acceptable overhead. More importantly, NFSA-based models are not entirely suitable
for system specification and standardization. Another serious concern is that few of
these models provide users with a safe schema representing the information that they
are allowed to access. Disclosing the original schema may cause unwanted information
leaks.
In this paper, we describe our Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) based query
rewriting approach (Section 2) that overcomes the drawbacks of the NFA-based Sys-
tems. The main contributions of this work include:
– A security model based on authorization attributes for XML (Section 2.1) in which
the security designer inserts the attributes in the XML Schema of the document
collection via a GUI. We then obtain a policy-dependent view of the schema (or
annotated schema).
– A formalization based on deterministic automata with a high level of generality
(an automaton can be implemented in different ways) and suitable for standardiza-
tion of the enforcement technique. From this formalization we straightforwardly
derive algorithms for computing the user view of the schema (Section 2.2) and the
rewriting DFA (Section 2.3) from the annotated schema.
– A way to exploit the standard operators EXCEPT and UNION of XPath to produce
a sound and complete rewriting procedure (Section 2.4) of the user query.
– The complexity analysis (Section 2.5) shows that the entire procedure is efficient
as it is linear with the size (i.e the number of element definitions) and the depth of
the repository schema.
A proof that our approach is sound and complete by means of a formal proof of correct-
ness has been presented in [?]. At the end of the paper, Section 3 concludes this paper
and discusses future work.
2 DFA-based Query Rewriting
In this section we present a novel approach for rewriting potentially unsafe user queries
into safe ones. Our technique is based on Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA). We
exploit the tree nature of the XML Schema to derive the DFA, which is the core of the
rewriting procedure.
2.1 Writing the security policy
The security administrator (SA) uses a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to specify for
each user class (role), the part of information that the users are granted or denied access
to. Indeed, in order to obtain a policy-dependent view of the schema, the SA annotates
the schema using security attributes. This technique was first used in SMOQE [22].
We define the following security attributes: access, condition and dirty.
Attribute access specifies the rights of the user on the node. The value of this at-
tribute is either allow or deny. Attribute condition contains a list of predicates
that have to evaluate to true for access to be granted. Attribute dirty indicates that
some descendants of the current node could be unauthorized. More precisely, a node
has a dirty attribute if it has at least one descendant node with either access=deny
or a non empty condition attribute attached to it. Annotating the original schema
means appending these attributes to element definitions in the schema. The annotated
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Fig. 1. The Showroom Schema (a) and the corresponding annotated Schema (b)
schema is no longer valid regarding W3C XML Schema recommendation. It is only an
internal representation of the security policy that is never disclosed to the user.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will consider a repository of XML documents
valid w.r.t. the schema depicted in Fig.1(a) as a working example. In this example, we
also consider user Alice and a policy that allows her access to element showroom,
conditionally grants her access to elements available and accessory and denies
access to sold. Alice is granted access to all other elements (except the descendants
of sold of course). The annotated schema is depicted in Fig.1 (b), where security
attributes are written in bold.
The remainder of the rewriting procedure, presented in the remaining subsections,
consists of three steps:
Step 1: The annotated XML schema is transformed according to the policy that
applies to each role. According to her role, the user is provided with the view of the
schema (in short Sv) she is entitled to see. Then, she can write her query using infor-
mation available on Sv. Henceforth, unless stated otherwise, the term view will refer to
the view of the schema and not to the view of a source document.
Step 2: The annotated schema is translated into an automaton which represents the
structure of Sv. Each state within Sv contains some security attributes that will further
serve us while rewriting the user request.
Step 3: The user query is rewritten using the finite state automaton.
2.2 Deriving the user view of the schema (Step 1)
Deriving the user view from the annotated schema is straightforward. We start at the root
of the annotated schema tree, and at each element definition, we proceed as follows:
– If the attribute access is allow without any condition then we keep the node as is


































Fig. 2. The User Schema View (a) and the Rewriting FSA (b)
– If access is allow and there is an attribute condition set then we redefine the
node as optional by adding the attribute minOccurs=0. In this way if a query gets
to fail because the condition is not satisfied, then the querist would not infer the
hiding of data.
– If access is deny then we discard the sub-tree rooted at the actual node from the
user view.
The view for user Alice is depicted in Fig.2(a).
2.3 Constructing the automaton (Step 2)
Constructing the rewriting automaton from the annotated schema is also straightfor-
ward. The automaton M derived from the annotated schema consists of an alphabet Σ,
a set of states S, a transition function T : S ×Σ → S, a start state s0 ∈ S, and a set of
accepting states A ⊂ S. The automaton is constructed as follows:
The alphabet Σ consists of the values of the attributes name of each element defin-
ition on the annotated schema.
Creating the states: We start at the root of the annotated schema. The state cor-
responding to the root (element schema) is s0. We create one state for each element
definition which has a dirty parent. Indeed, all other nodes (those not dirty) and
their subtrees are kept unchanged in the secured view. Hence they do not require to be
processed by the automaton. When we encounter a denied node, we create a state for
that element and skip the entire sub-tree rooted at that node. Each state s ∈ S (s 6= s0)
has attributes which represent the security attributes stated at the corresponding element
definition. We give to the state attributes the name and the value of their corresponding
security attributes. Each state s ∈ S (s 6= s0) is a final state (i.e. A = S \ {s0}).
Defining transitions: There exists a transition from a state si to a state sj if the
element definition corresponding to si is the parent of the element definition corre-
sponding to sj . The transition is labeled by the attribute name of the element definition
corresponding to sj .
The automaton derived from the annotated schema of Fig.1(b) is represented in
Fig.2(b).
2.4 Rewriting the request (Step 3)
We assume that the user writes her request using the subset XPath-- 3 of XPath ex-
pressions informally defined as follows:
XPath--:= ε|l| ∗ |p1/p2| //p1|p[q] where p1 and p2 are XPath-- expressions; ε, l, ∗
denote the empty path, a label and a wildcard, respectively; / and // stand for child-axis
and descendant-or-self-axis; and finally, q is called a qualifier. We rewrite the request in
the subset ζ:={ε|l|p1/p2|p[q]} of XPath-- using the functions union and except. ζ is
XPath-- without descendant-or-self axis (//) and wildcards (∗). Hereby, we alleviate
the rewriting process overhead since there is no need to backtrack in the automaton. We
therefore rewrite the query in two phases. First, we refine the submitted expression and
second, we rewrite the refined expression through the automaton.
Phase 1: refining the expression This step consists in refining the request on the
basis of the view the user is permitted to see. We first transform the user query (over
the repository) to an equivalent one (over the view). Second, we execute the latter on
the user view (Sv) and from the target node we go back up to the root node, adding
the encountered nodes on the path to form the refined expression. The goal of this pro-
cedure is to eliminate every // and * within the expression. As an example, if Alice
request is //vehicles/available then the equivalent expression over the view is
//element[@name="vehicles"]/complexType/sequence/
element[@name="available"] and the refined expression is
/showroom/vehicles/available.
Phase 2: Rewriting the request via the automaton The automaton represents the
view the user is permitted to see. Rewriting the user request consists of,
– processing the first token4 of the refined expression
– moving to the next state of the automaton until either the last token is received,
or a clean state (i.e., a state that has no attribute dirty) is met or a denied state is
encountered.
3 In [4] Gottlob, Koch and Picler show that the loss of expressive power of a fragment like
XPath-- w.r.t. XPath is minimal.
4 We call token a step in the path expression, for example showroom is the first token in
/showroom/vehicles/available, while vehicles is the second. / stands for a
lookahead.
When processing a token, we consider the two following cases:
– Queries without predicates. After reading the current token, the automaton uses the
attributes of the current state and behaves as follows:
– Access is deny. It rejects the request.
– Access is allow. There are two possibilities:
– – (1) If there is no attribute dirty then the user has the right to consult the entire
sub-tree rooted at that node. The token is kept as such, the value of the attribute
condition (if any) is attached to the token and the remainder of the source query
is appended to the rewritten query. Note that the attribute dirty is for optimizing
the rewriting procedure. Indeed, if the access is allow and if there is no attribute
dirty then we do not need to analyze the remaining tokens one by one. We can
directly append the remainder of the source query to the rewritten query.
– – (2) If there is the attribute dirty then the token is kept as such and if there
is an attribute condition, its content is attached to the token. Then, the analyzer
asks for the next token (if any).
If the last token has been fed into the automaton then we use the operator except
to eliminate each unauthorized node under the target nodes. If q denotes the rewrit-
ten expression after the last token has been fed into the automaton then the final
rewritten expression is q′ = q except (e1 ∪ e2 ∪ ... ∪ en), where each ej with
1 ≤ j ≤ n is computed as follows:
The automaton consults one after another the states corresponding to the children
of the node represented by the current state. At each state s corresponding to the
token l, we have the following:
If the attribute access = deny then l is appended to q. The result q/l becomes
one of the ej .
If the attribute access=allow and there is an attribute condition then the
negation of the content C of the attribute condition is appended to l. The result
l[not(C)] is appended to q. q/l[not(C)] becomes one of the ej . If there is also an
attribute dirty then the procedure goes deeper into the automaton (i.e. examines
the children of the current token l) and starts computing another ej with q now
being equal to q/l[C].
– Queries with predicates. The idea here is to stop processing the automaton when a
token with predicate(s) is received. We save the current state and check whether the
user has the right to consult the nodes that occur within the predicate(s). If she has
the right to, we return to the saved state and continue with the next token. Otherwise
the request is rejected.
2.5 Complexity analysis
The complexity of our approach is determined by that of steps 1, 2 and 3 of the rewriting
procedure. Let us assume that the repository schema contains n definitions of element
nodes. Deriving the user view of the schema (Section 2.2) takes at most O(n) time.
Constructing the automaton (Section 2.3) also requires at most O(n) time as well. If m
is the depth of the schema, then refining the expression (Section 2.4) takes O(m) time.
Since we rewrite the refined expressions by simply traversing the deterministic automa-
ton, this phase takes O(n) time. Hence, the overall time complexity of this proposal is
O(n+m).
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) based approach to
rewrite unsafe queries into safe ones, thus avoiding the many backtrackings inherent
to NFAs. We highlighted how our approach improves w.r.t. previous works in the area.
Also, we show that our technique is linear with the size and the depth of the repository
schema. Although our rewriting procedure is theoretically efficient and suggests good
performances, experiments remain work to be done. Moreover, our proposal leaves
space for further work. Other inspiring approaches [9], [19] enforce client-based ac-
cess control to XML. Indeed, in [9] and [19], the document is encrypted at the server
side and decrypted at the client side. The input of their system is then XML data and the
output is also XML data, while in our approach both the input and output is an XML
query. We are investigating the possibility to diminish the workload at the server side
by transferring the rewriting procedure at the client side. Finally, we are investigating
interfacing our technique with standard policy languages like XACML. Our DFA-based
approach is general enough to specify the enforcement of most XACML policies when
applied to protect XML data. We plan to develop this topic in a future paper.
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